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CULTURES OF OPTIMISM
Oliver Bennett
Abstract
Drawing on material from a broad range of fields, this article identifies an ‘optimism  
of everyday life’ and proposes that it performs significant psychological, social and  
cultural functions. These functions are briefly reviewed, with particular reference to  
psychological  and  physical  health,  family  and  social  relationships  and  the  
achievement of goals in different contexts. It is argued that the necessity of optimism  
has  given  rise  to  a  complex  of  optimism promoters,  which  function  as  agents  of  
implicit  cultural  policy.  The  family,  religious  institutions,  the  medical  profession,  
psychotherapists  and  counsellors,  businesses  and  political  leaders  are,  amongst  
others, all seen to be part of this complex, deeply engaged in the reproduction of a  
culture  of  optimism.  Whilst  a  multiplicity  of  values  is  reflected  in  individual  
expressions of optimism, a kind of meta-value is expressed in its common, cognitive  
form: of energy over entropy, of living over dying.
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Introduction
In  a  letter  to  Elie  Bertrand  in  February  1756,  Voltaire  described  optimism as  ‘a 
counsel of despair, a cruel philosophy with a consoling name’ (2005, 121).  Of course, 
he was not using the term in the sense to which we are now accustomed, that is, to 
denote  a  psychological  attitude,  but  in  the  sense  of  optimism  as  a  philosophical 
position.  This  had  been  first  expounded  by  the  German  philosopher,  Gottfried 
Leibnitz  (1966), who had argued that we inhabited the best of all  possible worlds 
because God, being all-powerful and all-knowing, was incapable of creating anything 
less. This was the doctrine that Voltaire so mercilessly satirised in Candide,1 which he 
wrote  two years  after  his  letter  to Bertrand,  creating  in  Dr Pangloss a  figure that 
would forever stand as a convenient referent for mindless optimism (2005). 
According to Lewis White Beck (1969, 235), an alternative idea of optimism emerged 
out of the Enlightenment, which, in contrast to the acquiescence in suffering implied 
by Leibnitz and parodied in Candide, denoted a vision of the future in which human 
beings  actively created  a  better  world.  There was a  heroic  quality  to  this  kind of 
optimism, with which Voltaire himself  was associated and which, in the twentieth 
century, was popularised by Gramsci with his ‘optimism of the will’ that could persist 
in the face of ‘pessimism of the intellect’ (Gramsci, 1973, 175). Leibniz’s optimism, 
on the other hand, was a religiously-inspired optimism of faith, through which God’s 
will  was seen to be benevolently working its  way out in the world.  This form of 
optimism can, of course, still be found in some contemporary Christian teaching (see, 
for example, Smith, 1995, 12) and secularised traces of it can arguably also be seen in 
the expectation produced by optimistic dispositions that good things rather than bad 
will generally happen.
During  much  of  the twentieth  century,  however,  Enlightenment  optimism,  closely 
associated with the idea of indefinite human progress, was eclipsed by the pervasive 
‘pessimism  of  the  intellect’  displayed  by  so  many  leading  writers,  artists  and 
intellectuals of the time. Of course, such pessimism was not in itself new and, indeed, 
the optimism of the Enlightenment could arguably be seen to offer no more than a 
brief interlude within the predominantly pessimistic register of Western intellectual 
history.  (Bennett,  2001,  1-12).  Even by the nineteenth  century,  this  optimism had 
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come under attack, with those such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche asserting that the 
forces of reason were no match for the destructive power of  basic human desires. 
But  it  was  during  the  twentieth  century,  described  by Isaiah  Berlin  as  ‘the  most 
terrible century in Western history’, that the optimism of the Enlightenment came to 
be most comprehensively dismantled. 
Sociology played its part in this process, with Max Weber, and, later, the Frankfurt 
School,  proving  particularly  influential  in  their  accounts  of  the  development  of 
instrumental rationality.  But sociology formed only one tributary into a much broader 
literature of pessimism that accumulated over the century. For example, a significant 
proportion of early to mid-century artistic and literary modernism represented a view 
of history that could only be described as catastrophic. From the Berlin Dadaists to 
the Surrealists in Paris, from Eliot’s Wasteland to Kafka’s Trial, from the dystopias of 
Huxley and Orwell  to the bleak landscapes  of Samuel  Beckett,  writers  and artists 
repeatedly denounced or despaired of the societies they inhabited. Their denunciations 
were delivered from radically differing positions and, politically, they could be seen 
to divide in extreme and polarised ways; but they shared a profound disillusion with 
the kind of world that philosophies of progress had bequeathed.
In  the  postmodern  period,  from  the  1960s  on,  narratives  of  decline  proliferated 
further,  to  the  extent  that  they  collectively  represented  a  pessimism  that  could 
justifiably be described as ‘cultural’. Such narratives could be found – and this is by 
no means exhaustive – in fields that included ecology, human rights, military history, 
international relations, criminology, history of science, cultural criticism and political 
economy (Bennett,  2001, 16). In his magisterial  account of counter-Enlightenment 
thinking, Enemies of Hope, Raymond Tallis charted in meticulous detail ‘the process 
by which contemporary humanity [was] talking itself into a terminal state of despair, 
self-disgust and impotence’ (1997, xiv). 
From time to time, this pessimism was explicitly challenged - amongst others, by the 
American  historian,  Francis  Fukuyama,(1992),  by  sporadic  interventions  from 
newspaper  columnists  (for  example,  Thompson-Noel,  1997 & Taylor,  2008),  and, 
most comprehensively, by Raymond Tallis himself, as mentioned above. However, as 
Tallis  caustically pointed out, pessimism had not only become deeply embedded in 
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the practice of cultural criticism, but it had also to some extent  become a mark of 
moral and intellectual seriousness (1997, 180). Cultural optimists, on the other hand, 
were often portrayed as shallow apologists for human suffering, ridiculed for their 
Pollyanna-ish naivety or condemned for their complicity (Gable & Haidt, 2005, 107). 
It  is  not  the  purpose of  this  article  to  evaluate  the  extent  to  which the  claims  of 
Enlightenment  optimism  may  or  may  not  be  superior  to  those  of  counter-
Enlightenment pessimism (or vice-versa). This debate has been well-rehearsed and, in 
any case, must always be as inconclusive as the future is uncertain. However, what 
the article does suggest, regardless of how endemic a pessimism of the intellect may 
have become, is that optimism nevertheless performs a number of very significant 
social  and  cultural  functions.  Indeed,  it  is  proposed  here  that  an  ‘optimism  of 
everyday life’ is so central to these functions that, without it, it is difficult to see how 
a society or civilisation would be able to sustain itself. 
If  this  proposition  is  accepted,  then  the  question  arises  of  how such optimism is 
transmitted from one generation to the next. As we shall see, some anthropologists 
have contended that optimism, displayed as it has been within all human cultures, has 
been  central  to  the  process  of  human  evolution  (Tiger,  1995).  Whilst  this  is  an 
important  reminder  that  culture  takes  place  within  an  evolutionary  and biological 
context, it  does not, of course, explain the various social  processes through which 
cultures of optimism are mediated and reproduced. These processes might properly be 
considered as manifestations of implicit cultural policy.  However, before enquiring 
further into this, it is first necessary to establish what we mean by an ‘optimism of 
everyday life’ and to develop in more detail the proposition that it is indeed essential 
to our social functioning.
The Optimism of Everyday Life2
In modern usage, optimism denotes a tendency to hold positive expectations of the 
future.  It  can  be seen  as  a  stronger  version  of  hope,  with  which  it  is  often  used 
interchangeably  (Gillham  et  al,  2000,  62).  The  older  idea  of  optimism,  as  a 
philosophical position, has now largely fallen out of use, although the two concepts 
are clearly not unrelated. However, in the discussion that follows, I shall largely be 
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focusing on optimism in its modern sense, defined by Lionel Tiger (1995, 18) as ‘a 
mood or attitude associated with an expectation about the social or material future’. 
This reference to mood usefully reminds us that optimism is not just a matter of ‘cold 
cognition’, to use Christopher Peterson’s phrase, but that it carries with it a strong 
emotional charge (Peterson, 2000, 45). In other words, the specific future imagined is 
not neutral but inextricably bound up with desirability, values and affect. Optimism 
also expresses probability – the belief that the anticipated future is more likely than 
not to materialise.  Whilst such assessments of probability may perhaps involve ‘cold 
cognition’,  even  here,  desirability  can  get  mixed  up  with  expectation,  and 
expectations can end up reflecting as much what is desired as what is probable.  
If optimism is an implicit expression of values and desires, it follows that it can have 
no single or absolute content, but will always be relative to the values and desires it 
expresses. Of course, there may be broad future scenarios, which most people would 
agree  were  desirable  (for  example,  that  planet  Earth  remained  a  hospitable 
environment for the human species), but desirable futures are as variable as values 
and  will  be  constructed  in  different,  and  often  conflicting,  ways.  One  person’s 
optimism can be another’s pessimism.
The content of optimism can also be distinguished by its ambition or reach.  Lionel 
Tiger (1995, 22) offers a distinction between ‘big optimism’ and ‘little optimism’  - 
the former expressing an attitude towards large matters, such as the condition of an 
economy or the outcome of  a  political  struggle;  the latter,  an expression of  more 
personal hopes, such as finding work or recovering from an illness. This might also be 
characterised as a distinction between an optimism looking outwards, to conditions in 
the external world, and an optimism looking inwards, to conditions in one’s own life. 
The two, of course, are not unrelated and, in some cultures, less unrelated than in 
others.  Nevertheless,  the  respective  scales  of  these  optimisms  are  significantly 
different.
Given all these variables, it might be objected that an ‘optimism of everyday life’, as a 
general category, would denote so many incommensurate expectations of the future 
that its function could not be analysed with any degree of precision. However, if we 
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draw a distinction between optimism as an attitude of mind, involving both cognition 
and  affect,  and  the  specific  futures  that  are  actually  imagined,  then  it  becomes 
possible  to  consider  optimism as  a  particular  mode of  viewing  the  future,  whose 
function can be considered separately from the variety of its expressions; in other 
words, a separation of form from content. 
Take,  for  example,  the  ‘big’  neo-Enlightenment  optimism of  Tallis  or  Fukuyama, 
which  expresses  an  attitude  towards  progress  and  the  general  advancement  of 
humanity, and contrast it to the countless ‘little’ optimisms that infuse most peoples’ 
lives. On the face of it, these might appear to have nothing in common  – the former, 
an  intellectual  optimism,  projected  on  to  a  large  canvas;  the  latter,   simply  the 
expression of personal hopes and desires. Yet, what they share is an attitude towards 
an uncertain future, which can only be imagined; and  how this future is imagined, 
whether on a large or small canvas, will at some level be inflected by a tendency – or 
disposition -  towards optimism or pessimism. 
Of course, it might be objected that, in the case of ‘big’ optimism, such inflections are 
neutralised  by  the  cognitive  rigours  of   academic  and  intellectual  discipline;  or, 
indeed, that it is not so much disposition that inflects cognition, but the other way 
round. These are important objections, which caution against too simplistic a model. 
Nevertheless,  as  I  have  argued  elsewhere  (Bennett,  2001,  194-5),  cognition, 
disposition and affect are intricately bound up with one another and, even if we allow 
that disposition can be moderated by cognition, the distinction between optimism as 
form and optimism as content can still be maintained.  
If the ‘form’ of optimism can be thus identified, the next task is to consider how its 
incidence might be established and the extent to which it  can be found within the 
human population.  Some preliminary conclusions on this  can tentatively be drawn 
from studies in social psychology that have been conducted over the last thirty years 
or  so  and  which,  more  recently,  have  led  to  the  foundation  of  the  ‘positive 
psychology’ movement (Gable & Haidt, 2005). In brief, this movement has arisen in 
reaction  to  what  its  founders  perceive  as  an  almost  exclusive  preoccupation  with 
psychological damage, which, at least until relatively recently, has characterised the 
development of psychology, and clinical psychology in particular, since the 1950s. As 
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Seligman  &  Csikszentmihalyi  have  noted,  the  science  of  psychology  has  largely 
concentrated  on ‘repairing  damage within  a  disease model  of  human functioning’ 
(2000, 5). 
Yet, this focus is at odds with how most people around the world experience their 
lives.  Despite  the  evidence  of  the  growing  incidence  of  depression  worldwide 
(Bennett, 2001, 189), studies have consistently shown that the majority of people in 
most places report that they are satisfied with their lives, even under very challenging 
conditions.3  This, of course, is not to condone such conditions - even less to avert 
attention from the manifest injustices in the world – but to note only the widespread 
capacity of human beings to experience satisfactory lives and subjective well-being 
under adverse circumstances. Gable & Haidt argue that ‘most people are doing well’ 
and that psychologists have tended ‘to overlook the greater part of human experience 
and the majority of people, families, groups, and institutions’ (2005, 105). Positive 
psychology, therefore, attempts to correct this imbalance, by revisiting the ‘average 
person’  and  investigating  the  mechanisms  that  enable  the  majority  of  people  to 
function as  well  as they do.  Psychology might  thus acquire  a  more  balanced and 
textured  understanding  of  human  experience,  which  could  also  yield  new clinical 
applications.
Studies  in  optimism  have  featured  prominently  in  the  development  of   this 
movement.  For example, Martin Seligman, one of its founders, shifted his attention 
to the function and promotion of optimism after years of studying the relationship 
between  pessimism  and  depression.  Seligman’s  key  discovery,  which  was 
consistently supported by subsequent research, was that an optimistic outlook played 
a crucial role in enabling people to sustain positive views of their life experiences and 
prospects across a broad range of contexts (1998, 207). As another group of  leading 
researchers in the field put it, optimists ‘are less distressed when times are tough, they 
cope in ways that foster better outcomes for themselves and are more positive in their 
responses to adversity’ (Scheier et al, 2000, 208).  These findings all suggest that the 
widespread  incidence  of  subjective  well-being,  noted  above,  may  be  inextricably 
bound up with a corresponding incidence of optimism. 
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In the course of their research, Seligman and his colleagues also developed a number 
of  different  ways  in  which tendencies  towards  optimism (or  pessimism)  could  be 
‘captured’ or measured. Seligman himself is associated, in particular, with a mode of 
analysis that focuses on an individual’s ’explanatory style’ – that is, how he or she 
explains  good  or  bad  life  events.  Using  a  self-report  questionnaire  called  the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ), the respondents are presented with a series 
of hypothetical events, both good and bad, and asked to indicate what they would 
consider  to  be the  one  major  cause  if  these  events  were  to  happen to  them.  The 
answers are then rated along the three dimensions of ‘permanence’, ‘pervasiveness’ 
and ‘personalisation’, which together are held to make up an individual’s explanatory 
style. Permanence implies that the suggested cause of the event will persist through 
time;  pervasiveness,  that  the  cause  will  bleed  over  from  one  department  of  an 
individual’s  life  to  another;  and  personalisation,  that  the  individual,  rather  than 
external circumstances, is responsible for what has happened. 
It follows from this that the higher the score in relation to good events, the higher an 
individual’s level of optimism will be: good events will be expected to continue to 
happen (permanence);  they  will  be  expected  to  happen  in  not  just  one  but  many 
departments of life (pervasiveness); and the cause of these events will be attributed to 
the agency of the individual (personalisation). The higher the scores in relation to bad 
events, the higher will be the indications of pessimism. Low scores, of course, relating 
to either good or bad events, provide indications in the opposite direction (Seligman, 
1998, 40-53).
One limitation of the ASQ method was that it could only be applied to the explanatory 
style of those willing and able to complete the ASQ questionnaire. This was overcome 
through an extension  of the method,  known as the Content  Analysis  of  Verbatim 
Explanations (CAVE). As well as using questionnaires, researchers found that they 
could  extract  causal  statements  from a  broad range of  recorded  material,  such as 
interviews, diaries and letters, and analyse them according to the ASQ scales. The 
analysis of explanatory style could thus be extended to a much wider range of people, 
including  those  no  longer  living.  It  also  facilitated  longitudinal  studies,  where 
recorded material was available from different periods of a person’s life.
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Whilst  the  ASQ and  CAVE methods  relate  levels  of  optimism to  perceptions  of 
causality,  another  approach,  developed  by  Michael  Scheier  and  Charles  Carver, 
focuses on what they term ‘dispositional optimism’. Here, optimism is constructed as 
a  personality  variable,  relatively  stable  across  time  and  context,  whose  defining 
characteristic is simply an expectation that good things rather than bad will generally 
happen (1992,  2-3).  It  can  be  measured  through a  brief  self-report  questionnaire, 
known  as  the  Life  Orientation  Test  (LOT).  Although  the  LOT  measure  reflects 
general expectation only,  in contrast to the ASQ/CAVE focus on the respondent’s 
perception of causality, the two approaches have tended to produce strikingly similar 
results (Peterson, 2000, 48).
Other  constructs  and  measures  of  optimism  have  also  been  developed  within 
psychology (see Norem & Chang, 2002 and Chang, 2000), but explanatory style and 
dispositional  optimism  remain  the  most  widely  cited.  The  weakness  of  these 
constructs,  and,  indeed,  of  constructs  of  optimism  in  general,  is  that  they  treat 
optimism as an isolatable element of human behaviour and do not take into account 
the extent to which it may have been influenced by other aspects of personality. As 
Norem & Chang have pointed out, ‘the question of whether optimism …[is] truly 
discriminable from related constructs has plagued researchers in this area from the 
start (2000, 351). Nevertheless, these measures are the best we have and, despite their  
limitations,  which  are  to  some  extent  an  occupational  hazard  in  all  personality 
research, they do at least give us some way of understanding how, and how widely, an 
‘optimism of everyday life’ actually manifests itself within the population.
A further perspective on optimism can also be gained from considering its biological 
aspects.  For  example,  there  is  some  evidence  to  suggest  that  there  is  a  genetic 
component to both dispositional optimism and explanatory style (Gillham et al, 2000, 
68), although it has not yet been possible to establish with any precision the extent of 
their  heritability.  Plomin et  al (1992) put it  about 25%, while Lykken & Tellegen 
(1996,  189),  in  a  study  of  individual  difference  in  human  happiness  (of  which 
optimism can be seen as a constituent part), estimated it at around 50%. One of the 
factors that complicates measurement, as Marvin Zuckerman points out, is that the 
heritability of optimism may be indirect, that is to say, derived from the heritability of 
other personality traits. Zuckerman himself suggests that optimism is partly linked to 
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the genetic bases of extraversion, while pessimism is partly a function of genes that 
produce neuroticism (2000, 177). This mirrors the point, made above, about the extent 
to which optimism might be seen as a dependent personality variable.
In  contrast,  from a  perspective  of  evolutionary  psychology,  Lionel  Tiger  has  no 
difficulty is seeing optimism as an isolatable element of human behaviour (1995, 17). 
He  argues  that  ‘a  neurophysiology  for  a  sense  of  benignity  of  the  future’  has 
developed  out  of  our  common  evolutionary  history  and  that  this  explains  why 
optimism has been a constant feature of all human cultures (1979, 51). A sense of 
optimism is thus a naturally occurring phenomenon within the majority of people and 
can  be  seen  as  no  more  and  no  less  than  an  adaptive  product  of  chemical 
neurotransmitters, such as serotonin  and dopamine. Tiger also notes that one of the 
primary functions of recreational drugs, including alcohol, and anti-depressants is to 
make the future seem benign. These drugs could not work if the body was not already 
‘hard-wired’  to  produce  this  sense  of  benignity.  Some  empirical  support  for  this 
proposition  has  recently  been offered  by scientists  at  New York University,  who, 
through the use of magnetic resonance imaging, have claimed to pinpoint the cradle of 
optimism in two regions of the brain (Sharot et al, 2007). As Tiger observed thirty 
years ago, ‘thinking rosy futures is as biological as sexual fantasies’ (1995, 35). 
For Zuckerman, the homo sapiens species must have been optimistic from the start, in 
order to come out of Africa and colonise the whole planet within the relatively short 
time  span  space  of  100,000  years  (2000,  170).  Tiger  seeks  to  explain  this  with 
reference  to  the  transition  made by vegetarian  primate  life  to  a  hunting-gathering 
species. The capacity to conceptualise the future, and to anticipate positive outcomes, 
must  have conferred an evolutionary advantage.  As the human species developed, 
accompanied by a growth in the size of the human brain and the development of its 
large cerebral cortex, so did the capacity to think things through and to think ahead. 
‘Being a hunting species’, Tiger argued, ‘humans must have hope. There must …be a 
programme for hope springing eternally in our innards’ (1995, 21). 
Tiger also connects these evolutionary developments with the emergence of religion 
(1995,  39-43).  Once  humans  began  to  anticipate  the  future,  then  they  could  also 
imagine what they feared, including their own death. Primitive religion thus emerged 
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as a particular form of optimism, which could counteract the paralysing effects of 
imagined terrors. Tiger concludes that since a key function of religion is to offer the 
solace of optimism (and since optimism is a biological phenomeneon), then religion 
itself must also have a biological basis, rooted in human genes - which is why it has 
reproduced itself in every civilisation.
There is still  a great deal that we do not know about the biological  dimension of 
optimism.  It  is  an  extremely  complex  area,  involving  not  only  evolutionary 
psychology but  also  behaviour  genetics,  neuropsychology and neuropharmacology 
(Zuckerman,  2000,  171).  However,  what  can  be  said,  as  the  observations  above 
indicate,  is  that  research  findings  in  these  areas  are  not  inconsistent  with  the 
‘optimism of everyday life’  that has been posited here.  This is not, of course, to 
suggest that an optimistic outlook is simply passed from one generation to the next in 
a simple process of biological reproduction. There is a great deal of evidence, derived 
mainly from research on  the relation of depression to pessimism, that indicates how a 
sense of optimism can be reinforced and nurtured by life experiences, particularly in 
childhood, or, conversely, diminished or destroyed (Bennett, 2001, 183-192). Indeed, 
as will be argued later in this article, the promotion and maintenance of optimism can 
be seen as a key function of many of our institutions – in effect, a form of implicit 
cultural  policy.  Nevertheless,  biological  factors  should  not  be ignored  and,  whilst 
offering  a  powerful  explanation  of  the  prevalence  of  optimism within  the  human 
population,  they  can  also  perhaps  contribute  to  our  understanding  of  individual 
difference – of why some individuals and not others are able to remain optimistic 
under difficult circumstances.
Before  concluding  this  section,  two  further  observations  need  to  be  made.  First, 
although it has been argued that the variable contents of optimism share a common 
‘form’, and that this form constitutes an ‘optimism of everyday life’, we should not 
assume that it remains constant over time and across different contexts (Garber, 2000, 
305;  Affleck  et  al,  2002,  149).  Many  people  will  experience  optimism  in  some 
domains  of  their  life,  or  at  some  times,  and  pessimism at  others.  There  is  some 
evidence  to  suggest  that,  where  optimism  has  been  destroyed  by  damaging  or 
traumatic  experiences,  those  of  an  optimistic  disposition  will  ‘drift  back’  to  an 
optimistic norm (Taylor & Brown, 1988, 202). But we should nevertheless be wary of 
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positing a ‘one size fits all’ optimism and, even more so, of attributing to it a general 
invulnerability. Optimism is, after all, one of the first casualties of depression, and, as 
noted  earlier,  a  global  increase  in  the  incidence  of  depression  has  been  widely 
reported. 
Secondly, much of the research on the psychology of optimism has originated from 
American  universities  with  American  citizens  as  its  subjects.   The  constructs  of 
optimism that have been developed have thus arisen from a quite specific cultural 
context. We should not assume, therefore, that optimism takes on precisely the same 
form in every other culture, even though, as we have seen, a universal basis does 
suggest itself in our evolutionary history.  For the most part, researchers have been 
aware of this and have exercised caution in generalising their findings too widely. For 
example,  Edward  Chang,  from  the  University  of  Michigan,  suggests  that,  in 
individualistic  countries,  such  as  the  US,  the  self  is  generally  constructed  as 
independent of others and, thus, for citizens of these countries, optimism is usually 
derived  from  an  expectation  of  personal  rather  than  group  happiness.  In  Asian 
countries,  on the other hand, where a more interdependent construct of the self  is 
traditionally  fostered,  optimism is  more  bound  up  with  the  success  of  the  group 
(Chang, 2002a, 258). Within the US, Sethi and Seligman found in an earlier study that 
religion  also  had  a  significant  bearing  on  the  formation  of  optimism,  with 
fundamentalist religions generating considerably more optimism than liberal religions 
(Sethi & Seligman, 1993, 259).
In  surveying  the  literature  on  optimism,  Christopher  Peterson  echoes  Chang  and 
observes that much of it, reflecting its own cultural bias, has been ‘curiously asocial’ 
(2000a,  50).  This  is  not,  of  course,  to  suggest  that  optimism performs  no  social 
function, only that that the emphasis of research has been on its function within the 
individual rather than society. Whilst this might be cast in terms of a psychological 
versus a sociological approach, the two are in fact closely entwined. Indeed, it is as 
difficult to conceive of an authentic, collective optimism that did not in some way 
answer to the desires of the individual as it is to conceive of an individual optimism 
that  had  no  social  dimension.  It  is  certainly  true  that  almost  all  the  research  on 
optimism has been conducted by psychologists,  and that there is  no ‘sociology of 
optimism’ to speak of. This may partly be due to the fact that within the development 
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of sociology itself, as noted earlier, pessimism has run deep. Indeed, it may not be 
pushing the point too far to suggest that a great deal of sociology, like psychology,  
has  focused  on  a  disease  model  of  human  functioning,  though,  in  the  case  of 
sociology, the diseases have of course been social rather than individual. But, as we 
shall see in the next section, the various functions of optimism that psychologists have 
identified have very clear social and cultural implications. How these functions are 
reproduced and reinforced by our institutions will be addressed in the final section of 
the article. 
The Functions of Optimism
In the Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus wrote that the foremost question of philosophy 
was why one should not commit suicide (1991, 3). To suggest that optimists do not 
commit suicide, or, to put it more precisely, that people do not usually commit suicide 
when in an optimism frame of mind, is not an answer to this question; but it does 
point to the importance of optimism as a prophylactic against those experiences of 
hopelessness and depression, which, in their more severe and sustained forms, can 
lead to suicide. One only has to think of the consequences, either at an individual or 
collective level, of a total collapse of hope to appreciate quite how significant this 
function of optimism is. Indeed, it is so central to human existence – as necessary as 
air, according to Lionel Tiger – that it often goes unnoticed and unremarked upon.
Even  those  who  display  the  ‘biggest’  of  intellectual  pessimisms,  concerning  the 
prospects of a people, a nation or even the human species itself, will almost always be 
found to nurture a zone of optimism, however small, in some part of their lives. 
This  phenomenon  has  been  well  documented  (Seligman,  1998;  Vaughan,  2000). 
There  is  now  also  a  significant  body  of  research  that  offers  insights  into  how 
optimism actually ‘works’. In a seminal article in 1988, Taylor and Brown pointed to 
the accumulating evidence that optimism was closely bound up with the harbouring of 
‘positive  illusions’  (1988,  196-7).  Numerous  studies  had established that  not  only 
were  such  illusions  held  by  most  people,  but  that  they  played  a  crucial  role  in 
maintaining subjective well-being and psychological health. This had challenged the 
widely  held  view,  dominant  amongst  psychologists  until  then,  that  such  health 
depended upon an accurate perception of reality (Taylor & Brown 1988, 193).
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According to Taylor and Brown, there are three dimensions to these illusions. Firstly, 
most people tend to maintain unrealistically positive views of themselves, persistently 
overestimating their strengths and discounting their weaknesses; secondly, they tend 
to  have  an  exaggerated  belief  in  their  ability  to  control  events;  and thirdly,  they 
nurture a view of the future that is unrealistically optimistic,  believing that it  will 
bring about what is personally or socially desirable rather than what is objectively 
likely  (1988,  197).  One  of  the  ways  in  which  this  unrealistic  optimism  is 
demonstrated is by the general propensity of  most individuals to think that they are 
less likely than their peers  to experience bad events (such as getting seriously ill) and 
more likely than their peers to experience good events (such as producing happy and 
successful  children).  Because,  of  course,  it  is  a  statistical  impossibility  for  most 
peoples’  futures  to be better  than most  others,  it  follows that  the optimism being 
expressed is illusory. The pervasiveness of these illusions is strongly correlated with 
the finding, mentioned in the previous section, that most people report being happy 
most of the time. It is interesting to note that most people also report that they are 
happier than most others – another statistical impossibility (Taylor & Brown, 1988, 
194-8). 
Even though it can clearly be seen that optimism strengthens subjective well-being, it 
might be thought that the benefits of this function would be outweighed, or at least 
cancelled out, by the negative impacts of harbouring ‘positive illusions’. After all, it is 
accurate information-processing, not cognitive distortion, that is usually held up as 
being essential for effective learning and successful social functioning. As we shall 
see, there can indeed be costs attached, but there are nevertheless a huge array of 
benefits  with  which  an  optimistic  disposition  or  explanatory  style  have  been 
associated. Where ‘positive illusions’ are involved, which would appear to be the rule 
rather than the exception, they have been shown to create self-fulfilling prophecies 
(Taylor & Brown, 1988, 199). 
In the area of health, an optimistic disposition has been closely likened to ‘superior 
psychosocial adaptation to a host of medical stressors’ (Afflek et al, 2000, 147). These 
have included conditions as varied as coronary artery bypass surgery, childbirth, bone 
marrow transplantation, HIV-positive status and cancer. A key factor in explaining 
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this is the tendency of optimists to ruminate significantly less on their problems than 
pessimists. There is also strong evidence of an ‘optimistic advantage’ in relation to 
physical  health  itself  (Scheier  & Carver,  1992),  although  the  precise  mechanisms 
linking the two are more difficult to establish. We know that optimists catch fewer 
infectious diseases than pessimists do and that their immune systems may also work 
better.  They also  tend  to  have  better  health  habits  and there  is  even  evidence  to 
suggest  that  they  may  live  longer  (Seligman,  1998,  14).  But  this  should  not  be 
construed  as  evidence  that  good  health  is  all  in  the  mind.  Indeed,  a  number  of 
researchers have emphasised that the major mechanism linking optimism and health is 
a ‘mundane behavioural pathway’ (Peterson & Bossio, 2000, 137; Zuckerman, 2000, 
183) - in other words, optimists have better health because they do the right things 
(like  eating  healthy  foods  and  taking  exercise).  Peterson  & Bossio  conclude  that 
optimism is indeed one of the determinants of good health, but that it needs to be seen 
as part of a complex web of biological,  psychological  and social  processes (2000, 
128).
There is also evidence that optimism fulfils an important function within marriages, 
partnerships, family life and social relationships in general. Indeed, without optimism 
there  would  be  no  families,  because  there  would  be  no  commitment  either  to 
reproduce in the first place or to nurture a future generation. This is not to suggest that 
such  optimism  is  always  conscious:  in  fact,  it  can  perhaps  best  be  seen  as  a 
manifestation  of  that  biological  optimism discussed  earlier.  For  Lionel  Tiger,  the 
imperative to reproduce,  expressed in sexual activity,  is  derived from ‘an ancient, 
deeply programmed biological process… which…connects the passionate present to 
the social future’ (1995, 114).
Within  marriages  and  partnerships,  it  appears  that  optimism,  measured  through 
explanatory style, has both immediate and long term impacts. Its immediate effects 
are on the day-to-day behaviour of partners; in the longer term, it appears to impact on 
the overall  quality of their  relationship,  which has knock-on consequences for the 
their  children  and  wider  society  (Fincham,  2000,  282).  Seligman  found  a  direct 
relationship between a parent’s general level of optimism (particularly the mother’s) 
and that of the child, although subsequent studies confirmed this link only when the 
child  perceived a mother’s  optimism (or pessimism)  as being specifically directed 
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towards him or her (Garber, 2000, 306).  Outside of the family, optimists appear to 
form satisfactory social relationships with considerably less difficulty than pessimists 
(Norem, 2000, 92; Chang, 2000b, 273; Dember, 2000, 291).
The  function  of  optimism  has  also  been  extensively  documented  in  relation  to 
achievement. If it is true, as the evidence suggests, that ‘when the going gets tough, 
the pessimistic stop going’, then the reverse is true as far as optimists are concerned. 
People with high expectations of success, which is a major component of optimism, 
have been shown to have more robust coping tendencies and to display more tenacity 
in the face of difficult problems than those with lower expectations. They also tend to 
work  harder  and  longer  and  to  devise  more  effective  problem-solving  strategies 
(Brown & Marshall, 2000, 240-1). For example, according to Aspinall et al, optimists 
appear better able to see all the features of a situation (‘global processing bias’), while 
those in a more pessimistic frame of mind tend to become absorbed in one component 
of it – in other words, they are unable to see the wood for the trees (2000, 232). 
The various fields in which optimism has been linked to higher achievement include 
education, electoral politics, military leadership, business and sport (Seligman, 1998, 
95-204). For example, in one notable study, researchers analysed the explanatory style 
of  US  presidential  candidates  between  1900  and  1984,  by  applying  the  CAVE 
technique (see page 8) to their acceptance-nomination speeches. In eighteen out of the 
twenty-two elections, voters chose the candidate who projected the greater optimism. 
The same researchers used this technique to predict  accurately the outcome of the 
1988 US presidential primaries (Seligman, 1998, 187-198). The CAVE technique has 
also been applied to the memoirs, diaries and letters of military leaders, such as the 
two renowned generals of the American Civil War, Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. 
Lee. In this study, optimism was indeed correlated with military success, with Grant’s 
significantly more optimistic outlook linked to his unexpected victories (Peterson & 
Bishop, 2000, 379).
As the preceding analysis indicates, there does now appear to be clear evidence that 
what  we  have  termed  the  ‘optimism  of  everyday  life’  performs  important 
psychological and social functions across a broad range of contexts. In particular, we 
have pointed to the areas of psychological health and subjective well-being, physical 
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health,  family and social  relationships  and the achievement  of goals.  It  is  not my 
intention,  however,  to  ‘fetishise’  optimism,  by  abstracting  it  from  all  other 
determinants and attributing to it an independent or asocial agency.  As I have already 
noted,  even if  it  can  be  established as  an isolatable  element  of  human  behaviour 
(which  is  by  no  means  certain),  it  is  still  entangled  with  other   cultural,  social, 
psychological and biological processes.
Nor is  it  my intention to suggest that  optimism is  always  positive  and pessimism 
negative. In politics and economics, for example, optimism can have obvious social 
costs,  such as bubbles  in  markets,  policy failures  and voter  disillusion (Schwartz, 
2000, 404-7).  Pessimists, on the other hand, can sometimes be less prone to cognitive 
distortion and relied upon to bring a ‘depressive realism’ to analysis and decision-
making  (Bennett,  2001,  195)  There  can  also  be  psychological  costs  to  optimism, 
where ‘positive illusions’ shift from constructive self-enhancement  to maladaptive 
and  destructive  egotism.  In  contrast,  ‘defensive  pessimism’  can  function  as  a 
successful psychological strategy -  a kind of ‘do-it-yourself’ cognitive therapy for 
anxiety (Norem, 2000). Nevertheless, despite these qualifications, it is evident  that 
optimism  –  as  a  mode  of  viewing  of  the  future  –  fulfils  a  central  social  and 
psychological function, in a way that pessimism clearly does not. Although, as we 
shall see, we may encounter rhetorics of pessimism, our institutions, and the social 
practices embedded in them, are almost without exception underpinned by ideologies 
of optimism. The content of these ideologies may conflict with one another, but in 
their mode of viewing the future, they can be seen to share a cultural form. In the next 
section,  the  reproduction  and  mediation  of  this  culture  will  be  considered  as  a 
manifestation of implicit cultural policy.
Optimism as Cultural Policy
The idea of implicit cultural policy was first introduced by Jeremy Ahearne (2004, 
112-136)  and  subsequently  refined  and  developed  in  a  special  issue  of  the 
International Journal of Cultural Policy (Ahearne & Bennett, 2009). In brief, whilst 
‘explicit’ cultural policy refers to policies explicitly labelled cultural, such as those 
pursued by ministries of culture around the world, ‘implicit’ cultural policy refers to 
all those deliberate courses of action intended to shape cultures, but which are not 
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expressly described as such. To some extent, these different constructs hinge upon a 
distinction  between  culture  in  the  narrower  sense  of  the  term,  as  a  set  of  artistic 
practices, and culture in the broader sense, as a set of behaviours, attitudes and values. 
When both constructs are brought together, the idea of cultural policy can be seen to 
encompass not only the sum total of a government’s action on culture, including arts, 
media, educational, industrial and foreign policy, but also the actions of a very much 
more diverse set of agents and agencies, which can all be seen to be in the business of 
cultural propagation. These can include individuals, such as public intellectuals and 
cultural critics, and all those organisations, ranging from the religious to the criminal 
(think of the mafia, for instance), which set out to promote a particular set of cultural 
values  or  practices.  In  the  issue  of  the  International  Journal  of  Cultural  Policy, 
mentioned above, the Roman Catholic Church, Islamic institutions in Egypt, Working 
Mens’ Clubs in England and elements of the British media are all seen to be operating 
forms of implicit cultural policy. 
Ahearne  also  introduces  the  idea  of  historical  necessity  into  cultural  policy.  In 
exploring Régis Debray’s   reflections  on French cultural  policy,  Ahearne suggests 
that, whilst explicit  cultural  policy,  as an autonomous area of public sector action, 
was not invented in  France until  the founding of the Ministry of Cultural  Affairs 
under André Malraux in 1959, implicit  cultural  policy ‘represents a transhistorical 
imperative  for  all  political  orders’  (2004,  114).  By  this  he  means  that  since  all 
political orders need, through the transmission of culture, to maintain their symbolic 
legitimacy, cultural policies have  de facto been in operation for as long as political 
power itself. In this view, a state is not a visible object, but a set of relations, and 
unless these relations are maintained (the role of culture), then the state will break 
down.  Cultural  policy  is  thus  not,  as  an  exclusive  focus  on  the  explicit  cultural 
policies of governments might suggest, the domain of a relatively minor department 
of government (often said to be the graveyard of ambitious ministers), but a necessary 
part of what holds a particular social and political order together.
This reference to necessity has a bearing on optimism at both the psychological and 
social level. We have already seen how the harbouring of ‘positive illusions’ plays an 
important role in maintaining subjective well-being and psychological good health. 
There are literally hundreds of studies showing that language, memory and thought 
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are selectively positive,  with most people evaluating themselves  positively and, in 
particular, more positively than they evaluate others (Peterson, 2000, 45). Anthony 
Greenwald,  Professor of Psychology at  the University of Washington,  has likened 
human nature to a totalitarian regime, with the individual ego constantly revising its 
own history and maintaining itself in the most-flattering way possible (1980, 603). 
Yet, this could not be sustained without collusion at the social  or collective level. 
Taylor  and  Brown  point  to  the  variety  of  social  norms  and  strategies  of  social 
interaction that conspire to protect the individual from the harsher side of reality:
Each person is able to live out positive illusions relatively immune to negative 
feedback, because individually and collectively, people construct a social world 
that is as self-enhancing as the private, internal one and a cognitive system that  
maintains it…[T]he capacity to develop and maintain positive illusions may be 
thought of as a valuable human resource to be nurtured and promoted, rather 
than an error-prone processing system to be corrected (1988, 203-5).
Taylor  and Brown are primarily  concerned with presenting the evidence  for these 
social norms and strategies and with analysing their function. However, what is of 
particular interest here, and indisputably a matter of cultural policy, is precisely how 
these optimistic norms are ‘nurtured and promoted’. As we have already seen, there is 
convincing  evidence  that  optimism  is,  in  part,  a  biological  imperative.  But  this 
imperative is both given form and institutionally reinforced by what Lionel Tiger has 
referred to as ‘a complex array of optimism promoters’ (1995, xxi).  
If we return briefly to some of those functions of optimism that we reviewed earlier,  
namely,  psychological  and physical  health,  family and social  relationships and the 
achievement of goals, the ubiquity of institutional optimism quickly becomes clear. In 
the area of psychological health, for example, the family is a key institution for the 
inculcation of optimism in children. Thanks to the work of object-relations theorists, 
such as John Bowlby, we now know enough about the importance of a child’s early 
years to understand how the family environment can impact on his or her long-term 
development. Without the nurturing of those optimistic tendencies referred to above 
by Taylor & Brown, children are much more likely to develop those negative attitudes 
about themselves and the future, which can lead to depression and anxiety disorders 
as they grow older (Garber, 2000, 307). Indeed, the rise in the worldwide incidence of 
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depression, mentioned earlier, has been attributed to the breakdown of the capacity of 
the family to provide this nurturing environment, due to soaring divorce rates and an 
increase  in  the  number  of  parents  who  themselves  are  suffering  from depressive 
illnesses (James, 1997, 128-158).  In effect, this can be seen as a policy failure on the 
part the family, one of the key institutions that plays a central role in the reproduction 
of cultures of optimism.  The responsibility for this failure should not, of course, be 
attributed  solely to  the family,  which,  as is  well  documented,  has been subject  to 
powerful, disintegrating  pressures from a number of  different directions (Bennett, 
2001, 89-95); but the family nevertheless remains a significant end-point at which this 
failure can be observed. 
The growing incidence of depressive and anxiety disorders – whether as a result of 
childhood experiences, life events or genetic disposition – has in the course of the 
twentieth century led to the rapid growth of new professions specifically concerned 
with the promotion and maintenance of psychological health. It is worth noting here 
that, in the early days of psychoanalysis, Freud had speculated that one day a new 
kind  of  social  worker  would  be  created   and  that  these  workers,  trained  in 
psychoanalytical  techniques,  would  form  ‘a  band  of  helpers  for  combating  the 
neuroses of civilisation’ (1986, 65). Although many of Freud’s techniques have now 
been widely discredited, his prediction has nevertheless largely been fulfilled by the 
multitude of analysts, therapists and counsellors that have followed in his wake.  This 
in turn has spawned a huge industry of self-help books and programmes,  most of 
which can at some level be seen to address the ‘optimism deficit’. For instance, in a 
typical example of the genre, Susan Vaughan links optimism to illusions of control 
over one’s life and, in outlining a programme for generating such illusions, promises 
that if you ‘train yourself to think like an optimist…you will gradually become one’ 
(2000, 156). In Britain, cognitive therapies of this kind (CBT) have recently attracted 
governmental support, with the Department of Health investing heavily in the training 
of new therapists and the improvement of access to services (DOH, 2007).
Whether  or  not  one  considers  religious  institutions  to  be  in  the  business  of 
propagating ‘positive illusions’ depends to a large extent  upon one’s own attitude 
towards  religious  faith;  but  they  are  indisputably  in  the  business  of  promoting 
optimism.  By way of  example,  a  particularly  striking  account  of  the  relationship 
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between optimism and Christian faith can be found in the writings of Helen Keller.  
The story of Keller’s life is well-known from her own autobiography and from the 
numerous films  and documentaries made about her: losing all vision and hearing at 
the age of eighteen months, probably due to scarlet fever, Keller, against all odds, 
acquired language and became a prolific author, public-speaker and political activist, 
committing herself, amongst other things, to the suffragette movement, pacifism and 
radical  socialism.   In  her  essay,  Optimism,  which  she  wrote  in  1903 as  a  young 
woman of twenty-three, Keller reflects that ‘deep, solemn optimism’, of the kind that 
enabled her to escape from ‘the depth where no hope was,’ is derived from a firm 
belief in the presence of God (1903, 13, 29). Marx, of course, in his description of 
religion as the opium of the people, also acknowledged the psychological power of 
faith,  albeit  in  unflattering  terms.  In  more  recent  times,  the  connections  between 
optimism, faith and happiness have been identified in a growing number of empirical 
studies (Myers, 2000, 331-333).
Turning  to  the  area  of  physical  health,  it  quickly  becomes  apparent  that  medical 
practice,  too,  is  underpinned  by  a  culture  of  optimism.  It  is  no  coincidence  that 
Raymond Tallis, whose extensive critique of contemporary pessimism was referred to 
earlier,  is  not  only  a  formidable  cultural  critic  but  also  a  professor  of  geriatric 
medicine. Medical scientists may no longer have quite the assurance they possessed in 
the 1950s and 1960s, when they confidently predicted that that by the twenty-first 
century every infectious disease in the world would have been eradicated (Garrett, 
1995,  30)  but,  as  Tallis  observes,  ‘the  goals  of  medicine  remain  what  they  have 
always been: cure some, improve many, comfort all’ (1997, 136). In both research 
and clinical practice, medical science continues to subscribe to a narrative of progress, 
in which the treatment of disease and the alleviation of suffering becomes ever more 
effective. This is not say that it does not acknowledge the scale of the problems it 
faces, not least those arising from its own successes, such as resistance to the drugs it 
has created and unprecedented human longevity.  Nor is it to ignore the role of the 
pharmaceutical industry, whose economic interests are integral to the development of 
medicine  itself.   But  medical  research  is  nevertheless  is  also  strongly  driven  by 
optimism and its clinical applications promote it. 
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The excessive optimism that has periodically produced market bubbles, such as the 
dot  com bubble  of  the  late  1990s,  and which,  most  recently,  has  resulted  in  the 
worldwide banking collapse of 2008, obscures the quotidian optimism without which 
no  business  would  be  able  to  function  satisfactorily.  However  sophisticated  the 
market research, a culture of optimism still has to be fostered if goods and services are 
to be sold and sales targets reached. This is most apparent within the recruitment and 
training  of  the  sales  force  itself,  as  Seligman  demonstrated  in  his  study  of  the 
Metropolitan Life insurance company in 1982 (Seligman, 1998, 95-115). At the time 
of the study, this organisation was recruiting 5,000 people to its sales force each year, 
out of a total  of 60,000 applications.  Half of these resigned in the first year,  with 
eighty per cent resigning by the end of the fourth year – at considerable cost to the 
company.  Using  the  ASQ  measure  of  explanatory  style,  Seligman  found  that 
optimism not only predicted who was most  likely to stay in the job but also who 
would achieve the greatest number of sales. (Presumably, it was pessimists who were 
most likely to buy life insurance, but this irony was not noted by Seligman!) Although 
the necessity of optimism is perhaps at its most obvious within the general area of 
sales, it finds expression in virtually all of aspects of business life, from the mission 
statement  down to  the  smallest  of  group  meetings.   In  the  non-profit  sector,  the 
disciplines  of  New  Public  Management,  and  the  never-ending  programme  of 
institutional change that comes with it, can be seen as an expression of that optimistic 
managerial  orthodoxy,  which holds that  increased efficiency and effectiveness can 
always be found. 
In politics, as we have already seen, expressions of optimism have been linked with 
electoral success. Although Barack Obama’s speeches and writings have, at the time 
of  writing,  not  been  rigorously  tested  for  optimism  through  CAVE  or  other 
procedures,  it  is  revealing  that  the book that  launched his bid for the Democratic 
nomination  in  2008  was  entitled  The  Audacity  of  Hope and  that  political 
commentators have referred to his ‘trademark optimism’ (Beaman, 2008). It is a fair 
assumption that, if he had been tested, he would have scored highly on any optimism 
measures  and  his  case  would  have  confirmed  the  earlier  studies.  Indeed,    his 
‘trademark  optimism’  was  almost  certainly  a  considered  element  in  his  electoral 
strategy. 
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What, however, has not been so widely discussed, is the way in which optimism is 
routinely deployed by political leaders as part of the broader strategy of maintaining 
their symbolic legitimacy once in power.  The necessity of such a strategy, it will be 
recalled, is what Ahearne referred to as the ‘transhistorical imperative’ that gives rise 
to implicit cultural policies across all political orders. The promotion of optimism can 
clearly be seen as one of these policies.  However bad the conditions  of a people, 
whatever difficulties they may face, an optimistic vision of the future will be used to 
legitimise the hardships of the present. Optimism will always trump pessimism. Take, 
for  example,  Barack  Obama’s  inaugural  address  of  2009.  Here,  the  condition  of 
America, which his administration faces, is set out in the most pessimistic terms:
Our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred. Our  
economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the 
part of some but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the  
nation for a new age.
   Homes have been lost, jobs shed, businesses shuttered. Our health care is too 
costly, our schools fail too many, and each day brings further evidence that the 
ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our planet.
   These  are  the  indicators  of  crisis,  subject  to  data  and  statistics.  Less 
measurable, but no less profound, is a sapping of confidence across our land; a 
nagging fear that America's decline is inevitable, that the next generation must 
lower its sights.
But, of course, the peroration does not end here, and Obama,  invoking the heroic 
struggles of the past – independence, Gettysburg, Normandy, civil rights -  assures the 
nation that the great challenges faced by the current generation of Americans will be 
overcome. Urging the nation to ‘brave once more the icy currents’ and to ‘endure 
what storms may come’, Obama holds out the promise that when future generations 
look back, they will know that ‘when we were tested we refused to let this journey 
end, and that we did not turn back nor did we falter’ (2009).
Inaugural  addresses  demand  both  rhetorical  ambition  and  elevated  gravitas, 
particularly  in  difficult  times  or  following  the  demise  of  an  unpopular  regime. 
Neither Margaret Thatcher nor Tony Blair possessed Obama’s rhetorical flair, nor do 
British Prime Ministers (who are not Heads of State) make inaugural addresses; but, 
traditionally,  they make brief statements to the people before entering 10 Downing 
Street for the first time. Here, too, both Thatcher and Blair can be seen to make use of 
optimistic tropes. Thatcher quotes St Francis of Assisi: ‘Where there is discord’, she 
pledges (without apparent irony), ‘may we bring harmony. Where there is error, may 
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we bring truth…And where there is despair, may we bring hope’. For Blair, his new 
government will simply ‘govern in the interests of all of our people, the whole of this 
nation. That’, he concludes, ‘I can promise you’. 
Conclusion
In this article, I have developed the construct of an ‘optimism of everyday life’ and 
proposed that it performs significant psychological, social and cultural functions. This 
construct can best be characterised as a mode of viewing the future, with no single or 
absolute  content,  but  with  a  common,  cognitive  form,  whose  functions  can  be 
considered separately from the diverse content  of  its  expressions.  These functions 
have been briefly reviewed, with particular reference to psychological and physical 
health,  family  and  social  relationships  and  the  achievement  of  goals  in  different 
contexts. I have argued that the necessity of optimism has given rise to a complex of 
optimism promoters, which function as agents of implicit cultural policy. The family,  
religious  institutions,  the  medical  profession,  psychotherapists  and  counsellors, 
businesses and political  leaders can,  amongst  others, all  be seen to be part of this 
complex, deeply engaged in the reproduction of a culture of optimism. 
As we have seen, optimism, like desire, rationality or ambition, is in its formal sense 
largely value-free: it is only in the specificities of its content that it takes on particular 
values. But the sum total of all the ‘big’ and ‘little’ optimisms, which make up the 
optimism of everyday life, can perhaps be seen to represent a kind of meta-value: of 
energy over entropy, of living over dying. This might help to explain not only the 
persistence of optimism, sometimes against all the odds, within individual lives, but 
also its vigorous promotion within so many of our institutions. 
A sociology of optimism, as mentioned earlier, has yet to be fully formulated. This 
article, which has drawn mainly on developments in social psychology, evolutionary 
biology and cultural  policy,  points  the  way to a  more  thoroughgoing sociological 
investigation. In particular, sociologists might throw further light on how optimism is 
socially  disseminated  across  the  generations;  at  how it  operates  within  the  public 
sphere and at the societal level; and how it might be said to be embedded in cultural 
practices and resources. Also, a more nuanced distinction between the personal and 
social dimensions of optimism could be usefully developed.4 
What  has  been  sketched  out  here  are  only  the  contours  of  a  cultural  policy  of 
optimism. Its proper articulation demands the work of more than one discipline. But 
24
this contribution has perhaps gone a small way to offering an alternative perspective 
on optimism, which, for some of us, never fully recovered from the damage inflicted 
to it by Dr Pangloss. 
25
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Notes
 John Butt suggests that Voltaire’s target was not so much Leibnitz, but his reductionist 
popularisers, such as Alexander Pope (Butt, p8).
2 To some readers in the social sciences the term ‘everyday life’ may have specific, negative 
connotations, which relate to routine, common sense reasoning procedures through which certain 
attitudes become ‘naturalised’. Whilst an optimism of everyday life might usefully be interrogated 
from this perspective, it is first of all necessary to distinguish between different forms of optimism 
and to consider the extent to which they manifest themselves within human societies. This is the 
purpose of  the following section of the paper, which draws largely on studies in social psychology.
3 For example, Biswas-Diener & Diener (2001) note that slum dwellers in Calcutta reported well 
above the neutral point on measures of life satisfaction.
4 I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers of this article for these suggestions.
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